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Farewell to
the 80s
For many on the left it was the bleak decade. But how did 
we manage to lose our way? David Burchell ruminates...
It ’s tempting to think of the ’eighties as the decade of an­ticlimax. Indeed, for many of 
those tutored in the wildly op­
tim istic  politics of the early  
’seventies ( ‘the anti-V ietnam  
R SL’, as Paddy M cGuinness 
would have it), it has seemed a 
gloomy decade of faded hopes, of 
defeat and disillusion.
Politically it could be seen as a decade 
dominated by the newfound ‘sexiness’ 
of big business and corporate values, by 
the startling populism of the radical 
right, by the host of altered assumptions 
about polity and economy which goes 
by the shorthand term ‘economic 
rationalism’, and by the defence of 
many gains long assumed to be per­
manent In the socialist world, as has by 
now become painfully apparent, the 
decade has seen the eclipse of almost 
any remaining self-confidence in the 
traditional socialist vision, and - among 
the more open leaderships, at least - a 
weary return to the more humdrum 
dreams of Western social democracy.
Culturally the great artefacts of the 
’eighties have been the rehashed musi­
cal emblems of the ’fifties, ’sixties and 
’seventies, from Motown to Merseyside 
and back again. Intellectually, it most 
characteristic currents have described 
themselves ubiquitously as Post- this or 
that, suggesting a loss of identity paral­
lelling that of retro-music and the 
splintered profusion of ‘lifestyles’.
It would be easy to view the decade 
exclusively in this way - with the
foresight of the ’seventies, as it were, 
rather than the hindsight of the ’nineties. 
But that would be too easy, too com- 
plicit in the tendency only too apparent 
on the Left to wish that some of the 
genuine new realities established in the 
’eighties would somehow just go away, 
or to pretend that they’d never happened 
at all.
Indeed, with hindsight the ’eighties 
may well come to be seen as a watershed 
decade in modem life. This is most ob­
vious in the international sphere, where 
the frozen compromise known as the 
‘post-war world’ for more than forty 
years now has been dramatically split 
apart by the rise of Gorbachev and dis­
armament by the decline of the USSR 
and the socialist world, and by the 
decline of American leadership in the 
W est We are now in a post-‘post-war’ 
world, and it is a measure of our loss of 
intellectual direction that we have no 
idea what to call it.
But in the individual nations of the (at 
least materially) ‘advanced’ world it has 
been equally significant On the one 
hand it has seen the completion of the 
vast social transform ation of the 
capitalist democracies over the 1950s- 
1970s, from societies of mass depriva­
tion to societies where (again, at least 
material) deprivation and oppression 
has become the preserve of outcasts and 
minorities. On the other hand it has seen 
the embedding of changes in political 
life in the last few decades: the fall of 
the old mass movements of the Left as 
movements (in the sense that the trade 
union movement once was); the dis­
solution of the political significance of
‘the working class’ as a unitary collec­
tive entity; the fragmentation of the sub­
ject of the old socialist vision into the 
much more complex set of identities by 
which people nowadays make sense of 
their lives. All of these things were ap­
parent tendencies over the thirty years 
of postwar history up to 1980: at the end 
of the decade they can mostly be viewed 
as accomplished fact.
Even the one guarantor of the tradi­
tional socialist vision, the world of ‘ac­
tually existing socialism’, has ceased to 
provide succour to that myth. Who 
knows but that there may be more voters 
of the Left in 1990 in Western Europe 
than in its Eastern neighbours? Conver­
sely, one sign of the times (at once im­
mensely refreshing and disturbing) is 
that there are actually fewer subjects 
off-bounds to the Left in Hungary or 
Poland today than in many, if not most, 
parts of the Western socialist move­
ment. Now that the spectre of ‘actually 
existing socialism’ has been laid, the 
last figleaf for the pretence that 'social 
ownership’ + egalitarian rhetoric = the 
good society has been blown away.
Standing at the vantage point of 1990, 
the milepost of 1940 conclusively 
seems an epoch away. To watch ’thirties 
films on TV now is to watch a different 
world. Listen to the memories of the 
generation now in their seventies: the 
taboos, icons, social stereotypes and ex­
pectations of several generations have 
become unhinged, and all in the course 
of thirty or so years. Certainly there is 
no shortage of racism, sexism or reac­
tion in our lives today; and the urge 
towards egalitarianism may well be
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weaker than fifty years ago. Yet the 
whole complex of assumptions which 
sustained a rigid and impoverished 
physical and emotional life for the mass 
of the population fifty years ago has 
splintered. Few people of today could 
be moved to other than mild hilarity by 
the social and military propaganda as­
sociated with the 1940s. Indeed, the 
foreign policy of the US in the 1980s has 
been dominated by the realisation that 
the myth of the nobility of dying for 
one’s country, once the summit of social 
‘belongingness’, has almost entirely 
vanished in our times. Now the only 
wars the US can practicably fight are 
those which solely kill other countries’ 
citizens.
None of these trends have been les­
sened by the perceived ‘conservative 
backlash’ of the ’eighties: on the con­
trary, they have accelerated. Cynicism 
about socialism has been parallelled by 
heightened cynicism about capitalism’s 
claims to moral virtue. Advertising 
companies, for instance, now genuinely 
worry that consumers are becoming too 
sceptical to believe anything told them 
by advertising methods. And while 
much excitement has been generated 
about the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, 
there has been noticeably little flag- 
waving for the moral superiority of its 
erstwhile rival.
Nor have the ‘new social issues’ nur­
tured in the fertile climate of the early 
’seventies retreated in the ’eighties - 
even if the movements associated with 
them have not always prospered. We are 
about to enter an election campaign 
featuring manifestoes based, however 
opportunistically, around Green issues 
(Labor) and childcare (the Coalition). 
What was once the stuff of youth rebel­
lion now nestles in the middle-aged sub­
urbs, as well as the inner-city ‘ghettoes’. 
The spread of ‘subcultures’ has become 
another postmodernist playground: 
rather than delineating ‘outsiders’, as 
they did in the Beat and hippie eras, they 
have splintered to the extent that few 
sixteen year-olds nowadays actually 
realise the specific cultural origins of 
their particular (to use a revived 
’sixties’ word) ‘scene’. Rap, one of the 
few ‘new’ musical subcultures of the 
’eighties, is a transparent combination 
of reggae, funk, heavy metal, even 
punk, along with an ethos which 
variously summons up ’sixties idealism, 
’seventies hedonism and ’eighties 
cynicism. The ‘vocal minorities’ of
society, the various ‘lifestyle’ misfits 
whom the cultural homogeneity of the 
’forties and ’fifties stigmatised as weir­
dos and oddballs, may today collective­
ly constitute something approaching a 
majority. Not even Middle Australia is 
safe...
☆ ☆ ☆
The left has made a mess of the 
’eighties. Historically it has had a ten­
dency to move in generational waves: 
the last decades of the nineteenth cen­
tury sustained the culture of the early 
twentieth; the 1930s and 1940s sus­
tained left culture, more or less ade­
quately, for the following thirty years. 
Likewise the rites of the late ’sixties and 
early ’seventies have dominated much 
of the twenty years thereafter. But this 
last has been a less socially cohesive, 
more fragmented culture, and one as­
sociated in the body politic with more 
‘marginal’ causes. And without the
myth of the Soviet Union to sustain it, it 
has been perilously  vague on its 
preferred utopia. Like its predecessors 
it has slowly exhausted itself: it has 
seemed steadily less able over the 
’eighties to comprehend the shifting 
mood of the times. Its countercultural 
roots have been pushed aside by new 
moralities, new political realities, and 
the evacuation from the field of politics 
generally of the transcendental One Big 
Cause, whichever particular cause that 
may have been.
Yet, paradoxically, the legacy of the 
’seventies Left is still ‘ahead of its 
times’. Only recently has environmen­
tal politics become a mass concern, but 
when it has the effect has been dramatic. 
And while the feminist movement itself 
may not have prospered in the ’eighties, 
its focus on the fabric of women’s per­
sonal lives has been echoed by the in­
creasin g  se lf-co n fid en c e  and 
assertiveness of a new generation of 
girls and young women. Indeed, the
AUSTRALIAN LEFT REVIEW 17
very fabric of political life itself has 
shifted from parties and towards move­
ments, as the Left predicted. Yet the 
L eft has not p rospered  from  its 
foresight And as a result it has become 
a culture more than ever out of sym­
pathy with its times, and with little em­
pathy for the worldview of young 
people outside its own ranks.
Why is this? One potent symbol of the 
’eighties is the word ‘yuppie’ - a word 
originally coined in the early years of 
the decade in the US to describe the 
explosion of the professions and the 
ranks of tertiary educated from the 
’seventies. In fact in this original, 
broader meaning it probably covers 
most of the ’seventies Left itself. Yet the 
word was very quickly taken up by jour­
nalists and others as a generalised 
swear-word against people ultimately 
very similar to themselves. And in the 
latter part of the decade it has been 
further reduced to a term of abuse 
directed against the profiteers of the 
decade - the young money men, stock­
brokers and ad quacks who’ve acquired 
their BMWs before the age of twenty 
five. The key to this evolution of the 
word ‘yuppie’ is that it was used over­
whelmingly by people who fitted its 
original description. It was a self-dis­
tancing device. Thirtysomething Lef­
ties in tastefully designed homes with 
all the contemporary knick knacks 
could use the word to keep a distance 
between themselves and the despised 
‘new materialism’, the fruits of which 
they were very likely enjoying. This 
urge to put oneself somehow ‘outside’ 
the social and material trends of the day 
was one telltale sign of the Left’s loss of 
grip on the tenor of the times.
Another was attitudes towards the 
ALP, and particularly the federal 
government. Who has not at least once 
succumbed to the thought ‘They’re all 
the same as each other’? In a decade 
when Hawke and Keating have jet­
tisoned much of the baggage of tradi­
tional social democracy even before it 
was really ingrained in our political cul­
ture, such instincts are entirely under­
standable.
At the same time, of course, the rise of 
the radical right has meant that in reality 
there is actually more of a distance now 
between the major parties on many 
questions than in the mid-’fifties, when 
a gentle middle of the road policy con­
sensus largely reigned in practice, 
whatever the rhetoric.
Hand in hand with this has gone a 
spurious nostalgia for the ‘traditional’ 
values of the ALP, selectively remem­
bered: not patriarchalism and the White 
Australia policy, but a rose-tinted vision 
of social justice, it seems. And by a 
mental sleight of hand we’ve often 
enacted a spurious self-alignment with 
the discontented blue-collar voters of 
suburbia, as if our shopping lists of so­
cial justice and social planning have 
somehow miraculously matched theirs 
of mortgage payments and law-and- 
order fears. The ALP in itself has been 
treated as the problem, rather than the 
wider political culture of mateship and 
suburban near-xenophobia which has 
traditionally shaped it and guided its 
values. The other, pragmatic, trend on 
the left has basically buckled down to 
take what it can get from the Hawke 
years, often without too much wider 
analysis. The result has been, in the first 
case, impotent outrage and, in the 
second, an atrophy of vision.
☆ ☆ ☆
It’s never easy to try to trace the trends 
of a decade ahead of its time. For a start 
the shape of parliamentary politics in 
Australia will obviously be crucially af­
fected by the result of the election in 
February or March: a win for the Coali­
tion could well give them a decade in 
which to take social and industrial 
policy by the throat. But if we’re look­
ing for signals we could do a lot worse 
(for the first time in decades) than look 
E ast The dramatic events there have 
more to say about our own visions than 
we may care to admit
In the first place it is becoming in­
creasingly clear that the old gulf be­
tween socialism and social democracy 
has finally been swallowed up. We 
might not find the face of contemporary 
Western social democracy to our liking, 
but we can no longer pretend that we 
inhabit a separate world. The recent 
events in Hungary have now made this 
inescapable. From here on the achieve­
ments of socialism will always have to 
be viewed as incremental increases on 
the old legacy of social democracy. This 
does not obviate the pressing need for a 
wider and more human vision than that 
of parliamentary parties of the centre- 
left, but it does mean that the policies 
aimed to fulfill that vision will have to 
be translatable into a common language 
of political debate. Socialism as the mo­
m ent o f the m agic wand -w hen 
problems such as balance of payments, 
tax trade-offs, even wage restraint are to 
m agically disappear - has passed 
forever.
Again, it is now blindingly apparent 
from the voices of Eastern Europe that 
any social transformation, however 
rapid or slow, must be measured first 
and foremost by its effect on civil 
society. It is no longer enough to talk 
a irily  o f ‘dram atically  extending 
dem ocracy’, ‘increasing workers 
control’ and all the rest as if such things 
could ever be enacted by legislation 
alone. The problems of the socialist 
world at present are very largely those 
of the nineteenth century dream of ra­
tional progress: the dream of creating an 
orderly world.
Socialists will never make people feel 
free: as conservatives (for once rightly) 
argue, that kind of experienced freedom 
is largely a negative effect of the ab­
sence of control. Socialism of the old 
style can engineer technical miracles, 
can generate economic growth (for a 
while at least) at high levels, can in­
crease social services (up to a point). 
But it suffers badly in comparison with 
the wealthier societies which, however 
unequal and u n ju st th e ir  so c ia l 
mechanisms, give people a felt sense of 
autonomy in their daily lives. The 
economist Geoff Hodgson once spoke 
of the ‘messiness principle’ in economic 
o rg an isa tio n : m eaning  th a t the 
economic building blocks of society 
should not be designed according to 
some pre-arranged ‘public’, ‘private’, 
‘co-operative’, etc, proportions. We 
need a similar ‘messiness principle’ in 
our visions of civil society.
These are all questions which find 
echoes in the forms and styles adopted 
by the Western Left or at least parts of 
it, since the ’seventies. What is chasten­
ing is that we have really got no further 
down that road in the last decade - at 
least partly because of our unease with 
the rites and rituals of our own civil 
society, particularly as it has exhibited 
itself in the ’eighties. Meanwhile some 
o f  our own q uestions are being 
answered for us at present in the 
socialist world - and the answers are 
often bleak. The grand task for the Left 
in the ’nineties is perhaps to conceive of 
a socialism so liberal, in the best sense 
o f  the w ord, th a t even E astern  
Europeans would want it.
